Japan's special "incubator" situations, 13 which it experienced under the "greenhouse" provided by the security alliance, Tokyo has never developed effective strategic planning to defend itself. 14 He argues "Japan was and still remains essentially a passive actor on the world political stage, more a trading company than a nation-state, a nation without a foreign policy in the usual sense of the word." 15 In contrast, some reactivists do not draw a line between high and low politics and claim that Japanese foreign policy performance is reactivist in both arenas. Calder asserts that Tokyo is a typical reactive state even in economic policy making, containing "essential characteristics" of the reactivist state: "(1) the state fails to undertake major independent foreign economic policy initiatives when it has the power and national incentives to do so; and (2) it responds to outside pressures for change, albeit erratically, unsystematically, and often incompletely." 16 Calder maintains that Japan avoids taking independent economic policy initiatives despite the country's "manifest economic and geostrategic resources and its demonstrated ability to operate strategically within its national boundaries." 17 Calder wonders why, despite its enhanced national capacity, Japan has been more deferential to American pressure than have most middle-range powers such as major European states. 18 Whether Japan is seen as reactivist only in high politics or in both high and low politics, there is a convergent view that the style of Japanese foreign policy is minimalist and risk avoiding. According to Blaker, the essence of Tokyo's behavior consists of "coping." 19 Coping involves "carefully assessing the international situation, methodically weighing each alternative, sorting out various options to see what is really serious, waiting for the dust to settle on some contentious issue, piecing together a 6 consensus view about the situation faced, and then performing the existing situation with the fewest risk." 20 Pyle echoes Blaker's point, citing Kiichi Miyazawa, former minister of foreign affairs and later prime minister, as saying: "All we can do when we are hit on the head is to pull back. We watch the world situation and follow the trends." 21 For reactivists, coping is a passive, timid, and minimalist strategy. In their view, coping is ineffective and doomed to fail. For example, Blaker claims that Japan's "minimalist coping approach has become jarringly inappropriate to Japan's vastly expanded international presence today." 22 The reactivist approach has both strengths and weaknesses. Reactivists correctly point out that gaiatsu usually comes from the United States and that Washington is the most influential source in the shaping of Japanese foreign policy. Moreover, the reactivist school is correct in asserting that Japanese diplomacy is risk avoiding and cautious. The Japanese government rarely makes a bold, unexpected foreign policy move. The accurate identification of domestic factors affecting Japanese foreign policy (i.e., the psychology of policy makers and the highly decentralized domestic decision making-mechanisms) is another strength of the reactivist approach.
At the same time, the reactivist approach has serious limitations. The main drawback is the faulty premise that changes in Japanese foreign policy occur only as a result of gaiatsu. On the contrary, the Japanese government often takes proactive initiatives, without waiting for instructions or pressure from foreign governments.
Moreover, the reactivist view suggests incorrectly that Japan faces an incessant barrage of gaiatsu from the United States and constantly adjusts itself to American demands. In fact, the U.S. government does not usually make demands on the Japanese government in 7 cases where there are no special stakes involved and no serious conflict of interest exists between the two countries. While Washington sometimes exerts strong pressure on Tokyo on issues crucial to American interests, at other times Washington remains tolerant of Japanese diplomacy. The view that Japan's reactivist, passive, and minimalist style prevails at any times undermines that nation's indigenous initiatives and exaggerates the frequency of gaiatsu on it.
Furthermore, the reactivist model is based on the false notion that gaiatsu always succeeds. In fact, gaiatsu sometimes fails. Japanese negotiators for trade and security arrangements with Washington often brush aside gaiatsu and refuse compromise.
Standing up to foreign demands has become an important public relations issue for some Japanese politicians who attempt to promote Japan's independent power. 23 If Japan always yielded to gaiatsu and accepted American demands entirely, there would be no trade conflicts between the two countries. It is apparent that pressure works at some times and not others. Clearly determining when and how gaiatsu works is a challenging task.
Proactive Model
In contrast to the reactivist school is the proactivist school, which is divided into three main groups. The first is a group of "revisionists," who believe that Japan is far from being reactive or passive but rather is an aggressive, mercantilist nation following a grand design to take over the world. Focusing on Japan's behavior in low politics, revisionists perceive Tokyo as being distinct from the West, with a different culture and politicoeconomic system. They contend that Japan is so different that it does not abide by Western economic rules. According to this view, the Japanese do not, and will not, embrace the values of free trade and liberalization, and it is thus a mistake to assume that the "Westernization" of Japan will bring the automatic liberalization of the Japanese economy and the harmonization of Western and Japanese global interests. In the revisionist view, Japan's unique mercantilism could eventually lead to a rupture with the West, and therefore Western governments need to "contain" Japan. 24 Some American revisionist writers, such as Tonelson and Morse, conclude that Japan is so assertive that any future efforts by the West to contain Japan are likely to fail. 25 The second proactivist group perceives Japan as a defensive state in both the economic and political spheres. While this group agrees with reactivists that Japanese foreign policy is low cost and low risk, it disagrees on the effectiveness of this strategy.
Proponents of the Japan-as-a-defensive-state thesis claim that the nation successfully pursues an active diplomacy, employing a benefit-maximizing strategy to serve Tokyo's national interest. In this view, Japan's low-risk diplomatic style is well planned; it is defensive in nature but beneficial to Tokyo. Proponents of this view argue that it is misleading to call Japanese diplomacy reactive; rather, it is active. For Pharr, "Japan, faced with a barrage of pressures from the United States and other industrial nations, has actively and successfully maneuvered to advantage among them while seeking to avoid risks of all kinds." 26 Pharr argues that despite gaiatsu, Japan can implement an effective foreign policy and, moreover, that it can actually take advantage of some gaiatsu. In her analysis of U.S.-Japan security relations, Pharr compares Japan's low-risk diplomacy to defensive driving: "For driving defensively is neither aggressive not passive, nor really 'reactive' since the driver is hardly changing basic direction as he adjusts to obstacles 9 before him. He is, after all, choosing a particular route even as he threads his way among the possible dangers before him." 27 The difference between defensive driving and Japan's foreign policy strategy, according to Pharr, is that the former takes place where routes are already there-available to the driver who chooses a route from existing roads but does not actually build them from scratch. In contrast, Japan's foreign policy is based on a design that has "emerged out of debate, discussion, and collective mood among successive generations of policy makers" in that nation. 28 Similarly, Wan finds Japan's economic strategy to be accommodating to the needs of other governments, but at the same time he concludes that it is also advantageous to Tokyo. He argues that Japan has wisely decided to support international regimes rather than challenge them in order to promote its national security and economic health. Wan claims that being passive (or, more precisely, appearing passive) is a choice that has benefited Tokyo. 29 The third proactivist group claims that Japan used to be reactive under the shadow of the United States but is now taking more active foreign policy initiatives. In their view, Japan, as "a rising state" in world politics, 30 has pursued an active policy since the 1970s, spurred by various factors including the U.S. defeat in the Vietnam War, Japan's impressive economic development, and America's declining economic power. 31 Like the reactivist model, the proactivist views have some strengths and some shortcomings. The "Japan-as-a-defensive-state" group's thesis that a low-risk, cautious approach is beneficial to Japan can explain some of Tokyo's diplomatic successes. For instance, as Pharr points out, during the 1950s U.S.-Japan negotiations for bilateral security arrangements, the United States, a military and economic superpower, made many concessions to Japan, which was still a developing country that had been devastated by its defeat in World War II. Pharr credits Prime Minister Yoshida's maneuvering ability for successfully persuading Washington to provide Tokyo with military protection, a factor that allowed Japan to concentrate on economic development in the postwar era. 32 In addition, the Japan-as-a-rising-state approach can explain Tokyo's past reactivism and present proactivism, as seen, for example, in its recent Official Development Assistance (ODA) policy. 33 In the 1950s Japan was a recipient of loans from the World Bank, and even in the 1970s Japan's financial contribution to the developing world was limited. Today, however, Japan is an important source of aid.
Tokyo has been the world's largest aid donor since 1991 and has taken numerous initiatives in distributing aid in the developing world.
At the same time, there are several shortcomings with the proactivist perspectives.
None of the proactivist groups can adequately explain the diplomatic blunders that the Japanese government occasionally makes, such as Japan's bungled handling of the Gulf War. Tokyo's tardy, ineffective response to the Gulf crisis hurt the nation's international standing, despite the fact that Tokyo's eventual financial contribution totaled $13 billion, approximately 20 percent of the overall cost of the Desert Storm campaign. 34 In addition, each of the proactivist schools has its own particular weakness. The revisionists' view of Japan as an aggressive mercantilist state focuses on Japan's economic policy but fails to account for political and strategic aspects of its foreign policy. The view of Japan as a defensive state cannot adequately explain changes in Japanese diplomacy. Treating Japanese foreign policy as static and fixed, this view underestimates the impact of world affairs on Japanese diplomacy and ignores how the nation adjusts its foreign policy behavior in response to the changing international environment. Finally, proponents of the Japan-as-a-rising-state thesis presume that Japanese foreign policy has followed a progressive evolution but fail to explain the occasional, temporary setback or retreat from activism.
Hybrid Model
To maximize the strengths of the proactivist and reactivist schools and minimize their weaknesses, I have proposed a hybrid model combining reactivism and proactivism. 35 I argue that Japan is reactive at times but becomes active at other times. I agree with Yasutomo, who, in his analysis on Japan's role at multilateral financial institutions, finds growing Japanese proactivism while at the same time recognizing the existence of reactivism in Japanese foreign policy. 36 According to Yasutomo, "Japan's recent diplomatic behavior reveals considerable reactivity and equivocation, but there are also concurrent indications of greater activism and even hints of leadership, especially since the last half of the 1980s." 37 The coexistence of reactivism and activism is the fundamental nature of Japanese foreign policy today, along with a growing activism in Japanese foreign policy in general. While supporters of the coexistence view may believe that Japan's reactivism and proactivism take place simultaneously in the same region (e.g., reactivism in high politics and activism in low politics in the same region at the same time), the present case study finds that each period of the above is characterized by either predominantly proactivist behavior or predominantly reactivist behavior in both low and high politics. The alternating diplomatic style between reactivism and proactivism does not indicate that Japan is exclusively reactive or proactive in each period. Even during a proactive period, there are some elements of reactivity. 38 This study argues that gaiatsu, especially from that from the United States, is the major factor contributing to these shifts. Gaiatsu significantly influences Japanese policymakers, especially those in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), who are keenly aware of the importance of Japan's cooperation with the United States in foreign policy areas and are sensitive to American pressure.
There are two faces of gaiatsu: one pressuring Japan to act and the other pressuring it not to act. The example of the Gulf War illustrates a case in which the United States pressured a passive Japan to act even though the latter was not interested in taking a proactive stance. In the case of Japan-Indochina relations, the second type of gaiatsu is at work. In this case, the United States pressured Japan not to act despite Unlike the reactivist model, which simply singles out the role of gaiatsu in changing Japan's foreign policy, or the proactivist model, which fails to take into account the interplay between gaiatsu and domestic politics, this chapter argues that foreign pressure works well when it can change the perspectives of policy makers by relating a given issue to their own concerns and interests.
As the proponents of Japan-as-a-defensive-state thesis suggest, Japan's foreign policy is usually carefully planned and based on cautious calculation, particularly regarding those Asian neighbors who still harbor anti-Japanese sentiment and see Tokyo
as not yet having come to proper terms with its past. While antipathy toward Japan's wartime aggression has recently subdued in some areas in Asia such as Thailand and Malaysia-where politico-economic leaders have begun to view Japan's economic activities and even its regional military presence in a positive light-Japan still has to 15 face its past in dealing with neighboring countries. Thus, during proactive periods as well as in reactive times, Tokyo is cautious, carefully calculating the international situation to its advantage and trying to minimize risks. Japan's restricted military capacity and its continued reliance on U.S.-Japan Security Treaty have also greatly affected Tokyo's diplomatic strategy. Mostly it resorts to "economic statecraft" 42 or, more specifically, "spending strategies" such as ODA. 43 Although economic tools can be effective when the international environment is peaceful and stable, the same tools are, by themselves, often limited during a time of crisis or war. 44 Thus, Japan places extraordinary emphasis on maintaining peace and stability: its leverage is lost in situations of conflict and crisis. Although in recent years Japan has begun to expand its military role by sending its Self Defense Forces (SDF) to conflict regions, its use of military means is still an anomaly. Japan has principally relied on economic statecraft to gain both economic and political influence during the proactive periods.
In summary, I propose a reactive-proactive hybrid model to analyze Japan's relations with Indochina based on the following points:
• The coexistence of reactivism and activism is fundamental to Japanese foreign policy. (In the case of Japan-Indochina relations, Japan has alternated between the two positions.)
• Gaiatsu, especially that from the United States, is the major factor contributing to these shifts. (In Japan-Indochina relations, Japan was reactive during strong gaiatsu and proactive at a time of reduced gaiatsu.)
• Gaiatsu intertwines with domestic politics and is effective when it changes the perspectives of Japanese domestic actors through synergistic linkage politics.
• Japan's proactivism is not aggressive, but cautious.
• Japan relies on spending strategies to implement its proactive policies and even to achieve political goals.
The following section of this chapter examines Japan's relations with Vietnam and Cambodia since the 1970s and analyzes how the hybrid model accounts for Japan's diplomatic behavior in the region. In the wake of the U.S. defeat in Vietnam, Japanese foreign policy makers worried that their nation might no longer be able to depend on American leadership in Indochina. At the same time, however, they welcomed reduced American constraints on Japan's policy in Southeast Asia and saw opportunities to have a freer hand to implement an independent policy in the region for the first time in Tokyo's postwar history. "heart-to-heart" diplomacy; and (3) equal partnership with ASEAN for building peace and prosperity throughout Southeast Asia. 58 The first and second points of the Fukuda doctrine were intended to erase the image of Japan as a potential military threat and economic aggressor and to create friendly relationships with Southeast Asian countries. With these two points, Fukuda sought to reduce resentment, which had arisen toward Japanese presence in the region due to the rapid penetration of Japanese goods. The 1974 anti-Japanese riots occasioned by Prime Minister Tanaka's trip to Jakarta and Bangkok had alarmed Japanese policy makers. Fukuda's speech to forge friendly relations with Southeast Asian countries reveals Japan's cautious approach in light of Japan's historical legacy of military aggression and the emerging fear of Japanese economic activities.
Japan's Relations with Vietnam and Cambodia since the 1970s
The most significant point of Fukuda's speech was the third point implying that Japan was willing to act as a political mediator between ASEAN and Communist Indochina to bring about peaceful coexistence. In summary, most of the 1970s saw the rise of independent Japanese initiatives in foreign policy toward Vietnam. Japan used economic strategies to actively pursue its goals, but cautiously, so as not to stoke anti-Japanese antagonism. The zenith of Tokyo's proactivism during this period was the Fukuda doctrine promoting Japan's role as a political mediator between ASEAN and Indochina.
Phase 2: Retreat to Reactivism
Unhappily for Japanese policy makers, Japan's activism in Indochina was short-lived. In 
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Of all the gaiatsu on Japan from a number of countries, U.S. pressure had the most significant impact. While Japanese policy makers-MOFA officials, politicians, and business leaders-wanted to continue aid to Vietnam, they were concerned that they would be seen by Washington as having legitimized the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia and that security and economic relations between the United States and Japan would deteriorate as a result. Washington to apologize to the U.S. public for the purchase of petroleum by Japanese firms. 73 Similarly, Japanese business leaders came to realize the seriousness of the rift in U.S.-Japan relations; they feared that if they defied American policy in Southeast Asia, they would risk losing the entire American market for Japanese products. Hanoi. 76 For example, Mitsui, one of the largest Japanese sogo-shosha, created a shadow company named Shinwa Co. to continue trade in Vietnam. 77 The fear of U.S. retaliation reached a peak in September 1987, when the U.S. Senate passed the "Kasten Resolution"
condemning Japanese business activities in Vietnam and urging the Japanese government to persuade its nation's firms to refrain from trading with the SRV. The resolution singled out Japanese business activities in Vietnam and ignored those of other countries, such as France, Malaysia, and Thailand, thus creating resentment among the Japanese business community, which perceived the resolution arising more from American "Japan-31 bashing" than from genuine concerns over the crisis in Cambodia. 78 Japanese firms, however, could not ignore this resolution, realizing that it could affect their performance in U.S. markets. Honda Motors, for example, voluntarily withdrew its plan for a motorcycle assembly plant in Ho Chi Minh City for fear of risking its large American market.
For the ten years following the 1979 PAVN occupation of Cambodia, gaiatsu restricted Japan's political and economic options in Indochina. Although it never abandoned the goals of the Fukuda doctrine, 79 Tokyo had little choice but to adjust itself to the rapidly changing international environment. Japan never openly sought a prominent economic role in Indochina, even though there were no legal restrictions on Japanese firms doing business in Vietnam. Japan's downsizing of relations with Vietnam and Cambodia was based on neither moral outrage over Hanoi's invasion of Cambodia nor concern for the fundamental issue of solving the Cambodian crisis, but rather was a response to the constraints of U.S.-Japan relations.
Phase III: Second Proactivism
In the late 1980s, Japan's Indochina policy changed following the collapse of the Soviet bloc, which effectively ended the geopolitical rivalries between the United States, the Soviet Union, and China of the Cold War era. With the thawing of Cold War tensions in Indochina, Vietnam no longer appeared as a threat to the capitalist bloc in Southeast Asia.
As a result, ASEAN leaders began to express their willingness to work toward settling the Cambodian problem. As Thai Prime Minister Chatichai Choonhavan stated in August 1988, Indochina was to be transformed "from a battlefield to a trading market." Of these five, the most significant was the dispatching armed forces to Cambodia. This, the first overseas deployment of Japanese military in the post-World War II era set an important precedent to allow for further military participation in international conflicts. The Japanese Diet passed a Peace Keeping Operations (PKO) bill in June 1992 to allow SDF to offer logistical support to the UNTAC, which was currently headed by Japanese UN diplomat Yasushi Akashi. This deployment of the SDF broke the taboo in postwar Japan against participation in overseas conflicts. However, the bill also limited SDF missions to traditional peacekeeping operations (i.e., with the use of weapons only for self-defense) and humanitarian assistance, indicating that military strategies were not replacing Japan's spending power. 83 While Japan's contribution toward settling the Cambodian problem was in general welcomed by the international community, Tokyo was not free from criticism. In particular, Japan's own 1991 peace proposal to the Cambodian factions raised concern among American delegates of the Perm Five, who regarded the proposal as interrupting the UN Security Council's effort to bring about peace in Cambodia. 84 Critics claimed that Japan had hastily joined the peace process to pursue its own self interest: to compensate for its diplomatic blunder in its response to the Gulf War and to gain support for its bid for a UN Security Council seat. 85 Although the critics were right about Japan's diplomatic motives, Japan was not, however, trying to usurp the peace process but rather to complement the Perm Five and ASEAN. While Tokyo's peace proposal did irritate U.S. representatives, this was unintentional. MOFA's meetings with the Cambodian factions to offer Japan's informal proposal for a peace settlement in Cambodia were, to the regret of the ministry, misinterpreted as bypassing the UN mechanism. Watanabe's request, Washington gave tacit approval to Tokyo, in summer 1992, to resume ODA. As the U.S. presidential election campaign intensified, however, the George H. Bush administration, which was concerned that MIA issues would surface among groups of prisoners of war (POW) should Japan resume ODA to Hanoi, requested that Japan delay its announcement of ODA resumption until after the U.S. presidential election in November 1992. Japanese policy makers wanted to restart aid as soon as possible, but they complied with the American pressure, and the aid was resumed within a week after the election. 87 This case illustrates how Japan-Vietnam relations were entangled with U.S.-Japan relations. In other words, as soon as the American gaiatsu declined, Japan moved rapidly toward implementing its goals. Furthermore, Japan has also played a key role in the Mekong River Commission (MRC), which was reestablished in 1995 from its predecessor, the Mekong Committee. The MRC has promoted the development of the Mekong River region and was headed by Yasunobu Matoba, a Japanese official from the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishery. With its spending strategies, Japan has become the leading actor promoting the reconstruction and development of Indochina.
Described as the revival of the Fukuda doctrine, the second Japanese proactive involvement in Indochina is analogous to that of the 1970s. 92 In the 1990s, Japan is once again pursuing an active, independent role in Southeast Asia. As before, Tokyo hopes to maintain peace and stability in Southeast Asia, contribute to the integration of Indochina into the rest of Southeast Asia, and increase Japan's economic and political influence in the region. While pursuing these goals, Japan assures its Asian neighbors that Tokyo will not become a military threat.
The revival of the Fukuda doctrine was first indicated by Prime Minister Toshiki
Kaifu during his trip to the ASEAN countries in May 1991. 93 In his Singapore speech, Kaifu expressed Japan's intention of assuming an active role in Asia, not only in the economic but also in the political sphere. At the same time, Kaifu apologized to the ASEAN audience for Japan's aggression during World War II. According to a Singaporean diplomat, Kaifu's speech represented a cautious, incremental step toward gaining Asian support for Japan's larger political role. 94 Kaifu's successor, Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa, issued a similar statement in January 1993 during his tour of the ASEAN countries. Miyazawa expressed Japan's interest in promoting the integration of Indochina into the rest of Southeast Asia and proposed that Japan and ASEAN cooperate in the economic reconstruction of Indochina through the establishment of the Indochina Forum. 95 Furthermore, in January 1997, Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto 39 reinforced Japan's role in Asia during his trip to Southeast Asia. While emphasizing the "heart-to-heart" relationship between Japan and ASEAN, 96 Hashimoto expressed Japan's readiness to participate in a summit-level forum with ASEAN to discuss Asian security, trade, and investment issues. At the same time, Hashimoto did not fail to mention that the U.S.-Japan security alliance would remain the core of Japanese foreign policy in the post-Cold War era. 97 His statement confirmed Tokyo's long-standing aspiration of pursuing its own policy in Asia, on the one hand, and strengthening the foundation of cooperation with the United States, on the other.
Although its second period of proactivism resembles that of the 1970s, Japan now faces new situations and challenges. First, all of Indochina has become part of ASEAN:
Vietnam joined in 1995, followed by Laos in 1997 and Cambodia in 1999. Japan now must develop a consistent policy toward both Indochina and the rest of Southeast Asia.
Japan is also expected to provide financial assistance to lessen the economic disparity between the initial ASEAN countries and poverty-stricken Indochina. Second, as the world's second largest economy, Japan has more ambitious political goals in the 1990s than it had in the 1970s. Since the early 1990s Japan has been trying to gain status in international politics commensurate with its economic strength, for example, by gaining a permanent seat at the UN Security Council. Tokyo views an active role in political affairs in Indochina as a stepping-stone for a greater leadership role in international political affairs. Third, the 1990s witnessed a surge of international interest in issues of human rights and democracy. Tokyo has thus far kept a low profile in these issues and has not had serious disputes with the United States, the world's key promoter of human rights diplomacy, over Japan's stance on human rights abuses by Vietnam and 40 Cambodia. 98 However, Japan may have to take a clear stand on human rights violations in Indochina. Japan's approach to human rights differs from that of the United States:
Washington regards the promotion of human rights and democracy as an important condition for sound economic development, whereas Japan holds the opposite view instead, contending that economic development must proceed democracy. These differing positions may pose a serious challenge to Tokyo's independent role in Indochina.
Japan is conducting a balancing act between its own desire to play an independent role in Asia and its obligation to maintain the fundamental framework of U.S.-Japan cooperation. 99 This balancing act (or, in Soeya's words, "two-track policy") 100 becomes difficult when the U.S.-Japan relationship poses serious constraints on Japan's own policies. If the constraints are insurmountable and gaiatsu can effectively change the perspectives of domestic actors, the Japanese government gives up its own desires in order to accommodate U.S. needs. Balancing becomes easier when US gaiatsu is at a minimum.
Conclusion
This analysis of Japan-Indochina relations compared three different perspectives on Japanese foreign policy: reactivism, proactivism, and a hybrid reactivism/proactivism.
The reactivist and hybrid approaches recognize the crucial role of U.S. pressure in influencing Japanese foreign policy; indeed, this pressure is the main strength of the reactivist perspective. Where the proactivist and hybrid perspectives converge is in recognizing that simply because Japan is cautious does not mean it is reactive, and that indeed, a cautious, low-risk approach can further Japan's proactive policy goals.
However, the hybrid model differs from both the reactivist and proactivist models. The hybrid view is distinguished from the reactivist view in analyzing what happens during periods of reduced U.S. gaiatsu. The reactivist model would have us believe that even in the absence of intense gaiatsu, Japan takes no initiatives on its own.
However, this analysis of Japan-Indochina relations shows that this is not the case. Japan has consistently sought to pursue its own policies in Indochina, making definite efforts, albeit cautiously, to advance its economic and political interests via foreign policy measures during periods of limited gaiatsu.
The hybrid model is distinguished from the proactivist model with regard to the role of gaiatsu. The proactivist model dismisses the gaiatsu factor in Japanese foreign policy, presuming that Japan's activism can prevail over gaiatsu at any time. This does not hold true in the case of Japan-Indochina relations. During the period of intense U.S. pressure, Japan did revert to a reactive stance. Japanese foreign policy toward Indochina is thus characterized by an alternation between reactivism and proactivism rather than only one or the other.
The hybrid approach toward understanding Japan-Indochina relations does not, however, suggest that this model is applicable to Japan's foreign policy behavior in all situations or on all issues. It still leaves many questions unanswered, for example, the relationship between the intended policies, implemented policies, and impact of Japanese proactivism toward Indochina. However, recognizing the coexistence of reactivism and proactivism and their alteration is a necessary first step toward addressing these broader
